After Mr. Doughty and Mr. Anderson funded the senior life settlement loans in 2008, they continued to seek financing to pay off debts related to, among other things, the Colorado lots and QMA. To that end, Mr. Anderson traveled to Dubai to discuss potential financing opportunities. Mr. Anderson took with him a phony $25,000,000 cashier's check from FSB, payable to "Fred Don Anderson or Assigns," with Altus Ventures as the remitter.

FDIC_0030770; DOUGHTY_31226, 31294. The check was post-dated to May 20, 2010, and signed by Mr. Doughty and his daughter, who was not authorized. Mr. Doughty later admitted in a bankruptcy deposition that the check was not a legitimate instrument and that he didn't tell anyone else at the bank about it. DOUGHTY_30424. Mr. Doughty explained that he kept the original and only gave Mr. Anderson a copy and that Mr. Anderson needed the check so he could say in Dubai that he had access to liquidity and capital.

"Because Rule 404(b) only limits evidence of 'other' crimes-those extrinsic to the charged crime-evidence of acts or events that are part of the crime itself, or evidence essential to the context of the crime, does not fall under the other crimes limitations of Rule 404(b)." United States v. Parker, 553 F.3d 1309, 1314-15 (10th Cir. 2009); see also United States v. Gorman, 312 F.3d 1159, 1162 (10th Cir. 2002) ("[A]cts intrinsic to or intertwined with the charged acts are not Rule 404(b) acts."). Mr. Doughty's failure to disclose the MAPI notes on his financial statements to The Bankers Bank is part of the same alleged bank fraud involving First State Bank and Vectra Bank.

Likewise, the defendants' bogus cashier's check for $25,000,000 is closely intertwined with the alleged counts and continues their concealment of material facts from-and brazen self-dealings through-First State Bank. Therefore, this proposed evidence will not be extrinsic to the charged offenses and should not be subject to a Rule 404(b) analysis. Nevertheless, the government gives this notice out of an abundance of caution, as would be required should the Court conclude that evidence described above qualifies as "other crimes, wrongs, or acts" under Rule 404(b).

If the Court were to treat any evidence from this notice under Rule 404(b), it should still be admitted. "[I]f the other act evidence is relevant and tends to prove a material fact other than the defendant's criminal disposition, it is offered for a proper purpose under Rule 404(b) and may be excluded only under Rule 403." United States v. Tan, 254 F.3d 1204, 1208 (10th Cir. 2001). Furthermore, "[i]t is well settled that the rule is one of inclusion which admits evidence of other crimes relevant to an issue in a trial, unless the evidence is introduced for an impermissible purpose or undue prejudice is shown." United States v. Cuch, 842 F.2d 1173, 1176 (10th Cir. 1988). To the extent the Court reviews the above-described, uncharged conduct under Rule 404(b), such evidence would be admissible to prove the defendants' motive, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, absence of mistake, or lack of accident in the alleged bank fraud schemes.

Finally, this is merely a notice under Rule 404(b), not a motion to admit the evidence. If either Mr. Doughty or Mr. Anderson intends to object to the admission of any evidence described in this notice and wants to be heard on that objection before trial, he should file a motion in limine with argument as to exactly which portions should be excluded.

Respectfully submitted,

MARK A. YANCEY
Acting United States Attorney

s/ Chris M. Stephens
CHRIS M. STEPHENS
Oklahoma Bar No. 20345
K. McKENZIE ANDERSON
Oklahoma Bar No. 30471
Assistant U.S. Attorneys
210 W. Park Avenue, Suite 400
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73102