Like the 1,000s of other pages of evidence uncovered and descriptions of crimes on this site, this web page is only one part of a massive multi-state entanglement of government corruption and cover-up. See size
CAPCO or CRAPCO How graphic comparisons expose CAPCO like tax credit incentive scams
Below are charts illustrating key differences between 3 different venture funding programs
- The traditional private sector venture Capital funding (VCF) model that was so successful in creating every high technology growth area in the US. Examples include Silicon Valley, Massachusetts, Denver and Austin TX.
- Insurance CAPCOs responsible for scamming several states out of $100's million before the scam was recognized.
- Oklahoma's CAPCO a variation of the Insurance CAPCOs.
The private sector VCF is the only legitimate version. The two CAPCOs are nothing more than financial shell games cleverly disguised as a private sector VCF. A close examination of the charts reveals significant major differences. The two CAPCOs use the same basic terminology, i.e. fund manager, investors and business ventures. The significant difference is the way the risk, cost and rewards are split. Anyone knowledgeable enough to perform calculations on real world scenarios would quickly realize the CAPCOs are merely a scam used to reap huge unearned profits at the public expense.
1. Charts illustrating differences between CAPCOs and private sector VCF
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Private sector Venture Capital Fund |
Private VCF Cost Share |
Private VCF Profit Share |
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State CAPCO Programs that scammed Oklahoma and several other states
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State CAPCO Cost Share |
State CAPCO Profit Share |
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2. Now see how Oklahoma version differs from basic CAPCOs
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Scam |
CAPCO |
CRAPCO - Oklahoma |
Investors |
Insurance companies |
Private |
Total refunded thru tax credits |
100% |
200% |
Milestones to meet |
A few, mostly irrelevant |
None |
State oversight/audit |
Yes. Varies by state |
None |
In essence CAPCO consisted of insurance companies partners providing states a 10 year loan. The venture Capitalist partners would have the task of managing the investments. Taking 50% of the loan off the top for management fees. Leaving the states obligated to repay the loan in the form of tax credits. An average of 10% in tax credits per year.
Oklahoma's CRAPCO is structured where:
1) The venture Capitalist find their own investors, cutting out the insurance companies. With no restrictions.
2) The state repays at the rate of 30% in tax credits up to 200% of the investment.
How does that work? This is the fraudulent shell game part. The venture Capitalist arranges a artificial loan to inflate the investment (money at risk) to appear nearly 700% as large as it is. Actually 690% which is what it takes to turn a 30% tax credit into 200%.
Note: The area of the law addressing the 200% limitations is ambiguous leaving it unclear, what, if anything, is in fact limited to 200%.
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3. Now compare the 3 private sector VCF, basic CAPCOs and Oklahoma's CAPCO
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Notes |
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Public |
None |
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None |
None |
Investors and VCF takes all the risk.
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Private sector VCF |
None |
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20% profits come after the investment is paid off (1) |
Investors |
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None |
Recover investment plus 80% of venture profits (1) |
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Public cost |
None |
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None |
None |
The public takes all the risk, yet receives no profits |
CAPCO |
None |
None |
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None |
None |
Insurance company |
None (3) |
None (3) |
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$13.6 million is interest |
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Public cost |
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None |
None |
The public takes all the risk, yet receives no profits |
OK CAPCO
Investors |
None |
None |
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In Summary, government subsidized CAPCO's lobbied for and received programs were they always make a profit, even when everyone else loses!
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